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Update
Volume 16, Number 4 (December 2000)

T he Rul e of Do ubl e Eff ec t:
A V alua ble Contempora ry Resourc e
By Gary Chartier

What is commonly called the rule,
or principle, of double effect provides a
simple strategy for resolving a certain
kind of moral conflict. The rule of
double effect embodies the conviction
that doing evil involves identifying
with evil, making it part of one’s own
project in the world. And, according to
the view of things presupposed by the
rule, we identify with evil when we
intend harm to ourselves or others.
The rule of double effect is also
grounded in the realization, however,
that our choices are sometimes
ambiguous. Too often, they result in
harm to us or others even as, at the
same time, they benefit us or others.
Can we choose well in such cases—can
we avoid identifying with evil? Or
must we “dirty our hands” in some
way?

Inside this issue:
Visions of Justice
and the Healing of
Nations
by Roy Branson

The rule of double effect reflects
the conviction that we can retain our
moral integrity in circumstances
marked by painful conflict. We can do
so if we acknowledge that we need not
identify with every effect that follows
from each of our choices. But this differs from some superficially similar
positions that maintain that intent is
the only thing that matters. For the
rule expresses a particular understanding of human action that limits what I
can plausibly be said to intend.
This kind of limitation makes good
sense. It is possible in principle to
deceive myself about the meaning of
an action, or to be deceived by others.
But a truthful apprehension of an
Continued on Page 2

David R. Larson Returns to
Full Time Teaching
After nearly two decades of leadership in the Center for Christian
Bioethics, David R. Larson has
decided to return to full time teaching
in Loma Linda University’s faculty of
Religion. He will begin a six-month
sabbatical on July 1, 2001 after which
he will continue to participate in the
life of the Center, but not in an administrative capacity.
Jack W. Provonsha, James W.
Walters and David R. Larson were
among those who began formulating
plans for the Center in the summer of
1982. In August of 1983 these propos-

als were approved by the LLU Board
of Trustees. The Center “opened its
doors” in January of 1984.
One of the Center’s first public
events was a Bioethics Grand Rounds
featuring
Robert
Veatch
of
Georgetown University’s Kennedy
Institute of Ethics. Another was a
national conference at LLU co-sponsored with The Hastings Center, then
led by Daniel Callahan in the state of
New York.
Over the years, Larson has served
the Center as Associate Director (19841986), Director (1986-1991) and
Theological Co-Director (1991-2001).
Throughout most of the 1990s, the
Center’s Clinical Co-Director was
Robert Orr who now serves in a similar
capacity at the University of Vermont.
From 1982, when plans for the
Center were being refined, until the
present, Larson has been aided by
three skilled administrative assistants.
Counting the time she worked on plans
for the Center while still employed by
the Faculty of Religion, Mrs.
Gwendolyn Utt served for a dozen
years, from 1982-1995. Mrs. Marigene
Sample served for five years, from
1995-2000. During the present school
year, 2000-2001, Mr. Takanobu Kinjo, a
recent graduate of LLU’s M.A. program in biomedical and clinical ethics
from Okinawa who is preparing his thesis for publication and himself for doctoral studies, is providing excellent
leadership in the Center’s office. ■
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action, and of the way it fits into the
architecture of my projects in the
world, does not permit me to attach
just any intention to any action. I can
tell myself that my intention as I speak
about topics related to theology and
ethics is to ensure that I receive an
Academy Award this year. But I cannot
reasonably believe that making public
presentations about theology and
ethics falls into any category for which
Academy Awards are conferred, or that,
if it were, my performance is of such
high quality that I could realistically
expect to be considered for it.
That, of course, is a relatively easy
example. I cannot say that I intend
something if I know that there is no
meaningful way for my intention to be
realized. What is perhaps the heart of
the rule of double effect depends on
the recognition that there are also
times when I cannot say that I do not
intend a particular outcome.
If I cause harm to someone else or
myself while seeking a particular goal,
was aware that harm would result from
my actions, and could have achieved
my goal without causing harm, then
the harm is apparently gratuitous. It is
hard to see why it might have occurred
except because I desired it for its own
sake—because I intended it. For
instance: if I repel an attacker by

shooting her when I knew a simple
push would be sufficient to protect
myself, then I must have desired her
death for some other reason. I must
have intended it.
As always, things are rather more
complicated than might first appear to
be the case. There may be a reason I
might desire some harm to occur even
if I do not value it for its own sake. I
might want it to occur because its
occurrence is a necessary prerequisite
to some other purpose of mine.
Suppose I bring about some harm to
someone else or myself, not because I
like the harm, or regard its occurrence
as a desirable state of affairs, but
because the harm is a required condition for a good outcome to occur. It is
still logically impossible for me to
understand my action as not including
the harm. The harm I am doing is part
of my project, part of my choice. I
identify with it.
To will—rather than simply to like,
endorse, affirm, or value—an outcome,
I must also will anything unavoidably
necessary to the achievement of that
goal. I cannot, for instance, will that I
win a foot race without willing that I
move my legs. I could, of course, will
that I receive a prize for winning. But I
cannot will that I win without willing
that I move my feet because part of
what it means to win a foot race is that
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I am able to use my feet and legs to
make my body move faster than any
other contestant.
To take a more complicated example: suppose my stingy and selfish
Uncle Charlie has an unaccountable
fondness for me, and has made me his
sole heir. His investment bank supports cigarette companies, firms that
produce toxic waste, and arms manufacturers, and it makes a great deal of
money. I have good reason to believe
that I could subtly and undetectably
worsen Uncle Charlie’s heart condition, something that would likely lead
to his death. As his heir, I, a thoroughly
benevolent person, could then redirect
his investment bank to worthy ends
that would foster peace and justice
across the globe.
If I pour the appropriate drops into
Uncle Charlie’s coffee, what is my
intention? I am engaging in self-deception if I maintain that my intention is
to foster peace and justice across the
globe. My intention at best is to kill
Uncle Charlie as a means of fostering
peace and justice across the globe. I
cannot simply say that I will peace and
justice. I am (again, at best) willing
peace and justice facilitated by the
death of Uncle Charlie. Because his
death is a consciously willed means to
my long-term purpose, and an integral
part of achieving that purpose, I identify with the harm done to him. I
intend it. And so I will evil.
It is in light of considerations like
these that the Western moral tradition
has elaborated the rule of double
effect. The rule holds that it is morally
appropriate to perform an action that
leads to harm for oneself or another
only if the following conditions are
met:
1. The action with a harmful consequence or consequences must be consistent with other moral sta ndards.
The rule of double effect is not a substitute for moral principles like the
Golden Rule and its cousins. Even if
the other conditions embodied in the
rule are met, one must still love one’s
neighbor as oneself, treat others as one
would have them treat oneself, act
only in such a way that one’s honestly
characterized intention could serve as
the basis for a universal rule. Whatever
the formulation, the point is clear: I
Continued on Page 7
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Visions of Justice and the Healing of Nations
by Roy Branson
Professor of History and Political Science
Columbia Union College

“If the world were to end with what astronomers call
‘death from above’ the first clue might come with the discovery
—late tonight, let’s say—of a distant fuzzball swimming
against a field of stars.” 1
According to this New Yorker scenario, the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory near Pasadena, California would
inform the world that “civilization might come to an end
in three months’ time.” Only two weeks before it reaches
earth, scientists determine that the approaching comet
will hit near Bermuda in the North Atlantic. Soon it is
bright enough to stand out in broad daylight. “In the last
days,” says the article, “the comet dominates the sky as
it does a billion nightmares.” Less than a day after
impact, a tidal wave six hundred feet high hits
Manhattan and submerges most of the earth’s coastal
cities. Accompanying meteorites, acting like fleets of
ICBMs, ignite conflagrations worldwide. Scattered
enclaves of people might survive, living like Vlad the
Impaler, but, intones the New Yorker, “a major comet
impact would end human civilization.” The New Yorker
explicitly connects its scientific evidence of what it calls
“death from above” with apocalyptic literature. It quotes
the eighth chapter of the Book of Revelation, and its
account of “a great star from heaven,” falling upon “the
fountain of waters,” from which “many men died of the
waters.”
Like the New Yorker, many tabloids and academics
typically identify the “Apocalypse” and “apocalyptic”
with cataclysm, upheaval, mayhem, and death.
Apocalyptic is invoked to describe not only the end of
the Waco sect, but the Apocalypse Now of the Vietnam
war, the miles of out-of-control fires set by the Gulf War,
and the smoke rising from the ovens of the Holocaust.
Krister Stendhal, once the dean of Harvard Divinity
School, has said the book of Revelation provides a “script
for a horror movie.”2 Jürgen Moltmann follows his
European theological colleagues in distinguishing “apocalyptic interpretations of annihilating end-times” from
the “eschatological exposure” of powers within human
history.3 For the masses—in both the media and the
academy—the god of the Apocalypse is a cosmic Dr.
Kervorkian—with an attitude. Apocalypse has come to
mean war, chaos, “death from above,” annihilation.
But what is the relevance of apocalyptic when it is
not equated with annihilation, but is known, as in the
original Greek, as “unveiling,” or “uncovering”?4 What is
the relevance of apocalyptic when it means the unveiling
of the transcendent active in both time and space?
Update Volume 16, Number 4

B ioethics and Vision
Bioethics did not announce its arrival trumpeting a
salvation epic. Vision was not its preferred mode of discourse. Instead, bioethics began with a quite specific
focus: the virtues of the individual physician. Andre
Hellegers, who claimed to have coined the word
“bioethics” in the late 1960s, was a physician and Dutchborn Catholic intellectual, who moved from the Johns
Hopkins Medical School faculty to Georgetown. In 1972,
he founded the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, one of the
first two institutions devoted to the field he had named.
Hellegers expected the new institution to be housed in
the medical school of Georgetown University. Why?
Because he anticipated that the Kennedy Institute of
Ethics would concentrate on educating physicians to
“recapture the Christian virtues of care.”5
Also in the late 1960s, Edmund Pellegrino, a physician, dean of two medical schools, and later the only lay
person to serve as president of Catholic University,
helped found humanities programs at medical schools
across the United States. Pellegrino, who eventually
became the third director of the Kennedy Institute, continues to urge bioethics to remain focused on individual
virtue. “One starts always with one’s commitment to be a
certain kind of person and then approaches clinical quandaries, conflicts of values and patient interests as a good
person ought.”6
Protestant theologians and philosophers and others
expanded the sphere of bioethics from the virtues of
individuals to obligations. Tom Beauchamp, a graduate of
a Methodist seminary before receiving a PhD in philosophy, has collaborated with James Childress, a Yaletrained theologian belonging to the Society of Friends, in
producing five editions of the Principles of Biomedical
Ethics, the bible of principle-based bioethics.
Robert Veatch, their colleague and the fourth director of the Kennedy Institute, openly draws parallels
between the Protestant doctrine of the “Priesthood of all
Believers”—a staple of his theological education at
Harvard—and equality. Throughout his entire career,
Veatch has championed the essential equality of persons
who are patients (laity) and physicians (clergy). Although
bioethics quickly expanded from virtue-ethics to obligation-ethics, it has taken longer for its old men to dream
dreams and its young bioethicists of both genders to see
visions. But there are more and more calls for bioethics to
expand its scope.
Mary Midgley, the British anthropologist and
philosopher, told bioethicists at the Hastings Center, in a
1995 lecture honoring Hans Jonas, that “imaginative
vision isn’t a luxury.”7 Without it, she argued, not only
3

morality, but science would not exist. Tristram
Englehardt, a physician and philosopher, has noted the
need of bioethics, particularly when it is recommending
public policies, to order principles and obligations
according to some view of the whole, some “common
moral vision.”8
William May, a theologian, has devoted his career to
expanding bioethical perspectives through the
metaphors and images of literature. He emphasizes that
bioethics must be more encompassing than an ethics of
obligation. Metaphors and images “do not operate as a
manual for getting the decision maker out of exceptional
moral binds.” Rather, a moral vision “makes moral
behavior seem more like a rite repeated than a puzzle
solved.”9
As these assertions indicate, virtuous practitioners of
the healing arts are needed. Protectors of patients rights
are necessary. But beyond the ethics of virtue and obligation people must glimpse a moral vision, a horizon of
imagination that draws communities from perception of
facts to concerted action. A sense of destiny leads to
moral action, not only through convincing argument, but
also through the lure of metaphor.
The ethics of virtue and obligation each assume a
somewhat larger context. Bioethics focused on cultivating the virtues of doctor and patient, particularly compassion and love, envisions medical practice conducted
within a culturally and morally integrated community—
something like Our Town, 19th century Salt Lake City,
or perhaps even the early Holy Roman Empire. Alisdair
McIntyre and Stanley Hauerwas, who eloquently stress
the centrality of virtue, lament the passing of harmonious
communities that hold in common a “thick” view of the
good. Hauerwas celebrates religious communities that
sustain the metaphors and rituals of the narratives that
give these communities identity. Interestingly, even
Robert Veatch has recently been willing to abandon
something so central to the ethics of obligation as
informed consent if professionals and lay persons are
both part of communities that permit them to find “value
pairings” based on “the most fundamental worldviews.”
The models for such communities are religious sects or
denominations with shared “deep value systems.”10
Veatch, and the many others who have devoted the
last twenty-five years to translating moral principles into
bioethical rules and norms, have themselves recognized
that the ethics of obligation assumes a dominant image.
Veatch, for one, has explicitly given William May, a theologian, credit for showing how a bioethics specifying
rules and norms, arising out of moral contracts, emerges
from the important image of covenant. For May, the contractual negotiations of an ethics of obligation are a thin
reflection—sometimes even a distortion—of the biblical
covenant, with its portrayal of divine gift and human
response.
Bioethicists have also found resources in the biblical
tradition. Those concerned with an ethics of virtue
emphasize narratives forming communities, particularly
the New Testament Gospels reflecting and shaping the
Christian Church. Those articulating an ethics of obliga4

tion have been shaped by the image of covenant emerging from the Pentateuch. But bioethics has not fully
embraced an ethics of vision, nor drawn the poetic visions
of the biblical tradition firmly into its canon—particularly
the dramatic vision of apocalyptic literature.
The A poca lypse of A poc alypses
The most influential expression of these expressions
of the apocalyptic vision is, of course, the Apocalypse, or
Revelation, of John. Of all the Christian apocalypses it
most incorporates expressions of the cosmic drama in the
canonical Hebrew prophets. The Apocalypse of John is
the coda of the biblical canon. In second-century writings,
it is quoted more than any other book in the New
Testament.11
The vision of John’s Apocalypse is universal. It is a
cosmic drama concerned with cosmos as well as kairos,
with creation as well as history. Generations of commentators have collapsed apocalyptic into eschatology—concern about the end-time. Actually, apocalyptic is the
genus, eschatology the species. The Society of Biblical
Literature Genres Project defines apocalyptic as literature that discloses “a reality which is both temporal, insofar as it envisages eschatological salvation, and spatial,
insofar as it involves another supernatural world.”12 In his
pivotal study of apocalyptic, The Open Heaven, Christopher
Rowland demonstrates that glimpsing heaven now was as
central to John and the other apocalyptic writers as peeking into the future. “Apocalyptic is as much involved in
the attempt to understand things as they are now as to
predict future events.”13
John places earth between the temple/court/palace
above, with its thousands times ten thousands singing
“blessing and honor and glory and power be unto him that
sitteth upon the throne” (Rev 5:13), and the
abyss/chaos/lake of fire below, the dark, dank, doomed
realm of the dragon (Rev 20:2-3, 10). Of course, John’s
universal perspective also places temporal reality in a present between a past that includes the death of Christ and
the original Eden, and a future that restores Eden as the
luminous New Jerusalem. The perspective is all-inclusive.
The Apocalypse of John is also dynamic. Time and
space have what Leonard Thompson calls “soft boundaries.”14 True, the heavenly realms are transcendent, but
John ascends to heaven, and angels descend. Christian
congregations reverberate to the singing of the heavenly
hosts. True, the future comes after a wiping away of present structures, but the future perfect state can be recognized as a city, filled, not with grotesque, hybrid
creatures, but people with recognizable, resurrected bodies. Previous social roles can be recognized. In John’s
vision, even time and space are permeable to each other.
The future city, transcendent to us in time, resembles
heaven, transcendent to us in space. Most importantly for
ethics, the apocalyptic vision assures us that the moral
choices we make here and now have cosmic and eternal
significance.
The dynamism of John’s vision does not attempt to
clarify moral problems by reducing them to manageable
Update Volume 16, Number 4

Continued from page 2

size. Apocalyptic attempts to improve perception by
expansion and allusion. John is not trying to make ethical
judgment of moral action easy, but true to the vastness
and richness of a moral universe.
John’s vision of justice strips bare the pretensions of
the whore/Babylon/Rome. As unremittingly as any
Hebrew prophet, John rhetorically overturns the empire’s
oppressive political, economic, and social power: The
“kings of the earth” who have been seduced by her
power are doomed, “the merchants of the earth,” who
“have grown rich from the power of her luxury,” who
profit from trafficking in “slaves—and human lives;” and
the ship owners, who “grew rich….by her wealth” (Rev
18:3, 13, 17-19, 23 RSV). John culminates the HebrewChristian bias towards the vulnerable and oppressed.
John’s rhetoric is passionate, what Elisabeth
Schussler Fiorenza describes as “theo-ethical rhetoric,”
filled with a “symphony of images.”15 Worshipers, hearing
and
repeating
the
Apocalypse in church services,
are drawn into condemnation of
the evil empire, its oppression,
its ostentatious wealth, its blasphemous pretensions to ultimate
authority.
John’s
metaphors strip Rome of its
glamour and legitimacy. Taunts
and threats carry out surprise
attacks,
execute
frontal
assaults. John draws his congregations into a revolution of
the imagination.
Martha Nussbaum, a philosopher steeped in Greek
drama, values the great, classic works of the imagination
because they engage the passions so deeply we actually
take moral action. “The link between passion and the
deliberately undertaken, she says, is forged by the imagination.”16 For her, the imagination is crucial to morality
because it moves the passions, which are nothing less
than forms of belief.
Is a belief empty of passion really a belief? If we see
an outrage perpetrated against a vulnerable person and
feel nothing, do we really believe an outrage is being
committed? If we do or say nothing to protest ethnic
cleansing, do we really believe it is morally reprehensible? Through the metaphors, images, and poetry of the
imagination, the apocalyptic vision engages us to go
beyond recognizing a moral wrong to believing strongly
enough to actually do something.
The apocalyptic vision aims to ignite the passions.
But the Apocalypse of John suggests that its most powerful word is not condemnation of evil, but evocation of the
good. The dazzling color and music of goodness allure us,
alienating our affections from horrifying images of evil.
The greatest gift of the Apocalypse of John the Revelator
is to gather together the visions of the good society
throughout the Jewish and Christian traditions and
declare with Ezekial, Second Isaiah, Paul, and the writers
of the synoptic gospels that there actually is a moral
order; visions so dazzling, so piercingly vivid, that we are

drawn into participating in the healing of the nations.
The power visions of the apocalyptic vision may lie
behind some other visions not usually associated with it.
The universality of apocalyptic and its commitment to a
perfect, just society may lie behind the Enlightenment’s
vision of a community of equals, where all are endowed
with certain unalienable rights.17 An Enlightenment so
certain, so passionately committed to the importance of
that vision helped to inspire democratic and socialist revolutions throughout three centuries.18 Social reforms,
such as the abolition of slavery, were directly fueled by
the apocalyptic vision. The Civil War has been called the
American Apocalypse.19 Jürgen Moltmann has said that
the United States, founded on the Declaration of
Independence, the constitution, and the Bill of Rights,
“a country—and the first country—for all humanity,”
committed to gathering in people from all the nations,
“makes this political experiment a messianic experiment.”20
Of course, the more
these sweeping moral, social,
and political movements are
laid at the feet of apocalyptic,
the more bloody the “healing
of the nations” sounds.
Contemporary commentators
insist that it is crucial to see
how John identified the prototypical apocalyptic figure of
the conqueror with Christ, “the
Lamb that was slaughtered.”
Richard B. Hays, who makes the apocalyptic vision
central to his highly acclaimed work, The Moral Vision of
the New Testament: A Contemporary Introduction to New
Testament Ethics, points out that “the Lamb that was
slaughtered” appears twenty-eight times in Revelation.
He quotes David L. Barr, who says that “The Lamb is
the Lion. Jesus is the Messiah, but he has performed his
messianic office in a most extraordinary way, by his
death...We must now give a radical new valuation to
lambs; the sufferer is the conqueror, the victim the victor.” Hays is convinced that rather than the blood-soaked
“Battle Hymn of the Republic,” that inspired the northern armies in “America’s Apocalypse,” marchers of
America’s nonviolent civil rights movement captured the
essence of “The Lamb that was slain” in Revelation with
their haunting hymn, “We Shall Overcome.”
“Overcome” is the word used by the King James Version
to translate the Greek word translated in other versions
as “conquer.” Those who would truly emulate the
Christian Apocalypse of John are willing to challenge the
evil powers even if resistance demands sacrifice.21

“Those with an apocalyptic vision
oppose the tyrannies of disability
and disease, not to coerce the
arrival of the city of God, but to
enact His ideal civilization.”

Update Volume 16, Number 4

The Apoca lyptic V ision and Bioethic s
“So now, Theophilus, here is the truth concerning
those about which we have studied.” I am not the apostle Luke, nor a physician—just a student of ethics. But
we are supposed to be arriving at an “orderly account” of
the connection between an ethics of vision, of which
apocalyptic is the most dramatic, and bioethics. What rel5

evance, for example, does an ethics of vision have for the
persistent problem of death and dying? The answer
begins with alternative bioethical approaches.
An ethics of virtue would—and has—stressed the
importance of health professionals developing greater
compassionate care for the dying. The moral ideal is for
health professionals to be loving enough to help dying
patients reach acceptance of their impending deaths.
The hospice, for example, is the communal expression of
the virtue of love for the dying. With regard to the dying,
Elizabeth Kubler Ross and Cicily Saunders embody the
virtue of compassionate love.
An ethics of obligation claims—and if necessary,
demands—the rights of the dying patient. Among other
claims, the competent patient has the right to be fully
informed about his or her condition and treatment
options; the right to stop “extraordinary” treatment; and
now, it is being insisted by some, the right to be assisted
by a physician in committing suicide. More carefully put,
the claim is not the positive right to be assisted, but the
negative right of a physician to not be interfered with if
the physician assists a person to commit suicide.
Although many less flamboyant and irascible are just as
adamant about the necessity of recognizing the rights of
the dying on a variety of issues, in the mind of the public, the obvious representative of the ethics of obligation
regarding the dying is Dr. Kervorkian.
Note that from opposite sides, the ethics of virtue
and the ethics of obligation focus on the doctor-patient
(or health professional-patient) relationship. Since its
emergence in the 1960s, this remains bioethics’ primary
concern. The ethics of vision expands that focus. For an
ethics of vision, death, not just the dying patient,
becomes the concern. The ethics of vision looks at powerful, maybe hidden agents of death. The agents causing
death on a large scale may prove to be so numerous and
their relationship so complex, that the task of identifying
them appears daunting. But an ethics of vision never permits the moral task to shrink into insignificance. If necessary, resources are summoned to challenge the agents
of death. Not surprisingly, given the expansive scope of
their perspective, an ethics of vision seems particularly
relevant to those concerned with public health. Those in
public life most typifying a moral concern beyond the
reaches of traditional bioethics would include Ralph
Nader, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, and David
Kessler, former director of the Food and Drug
Administration.
Ralph Nader persists in revealing the unnoticed corporate causes of avoidable deaths—auto manufacturers,
food companies, and drug manufacturers. Mothers
Against Drunk Driving shame states and local governments into adopting laws that save teenage lives. David
Kessler began taking steps to restrain the largest advertisers and highest contributors to U.S. political campaigns, the multinational tobacco corporations, who seek
out youngsters and women to fill their quota of 3,000 new
smokers a day in the United States, 1,000 of whom they
know will die from smoking-related causes; and who
profit in the billions of dollars from the 3,000,000 people,
6

worldwide, who die each year from tobacco-related
causes.
But what relevance does a specifically apocalyptic
vision have? The more expansive the threats of death,
the complexity of its origins, the more powerful its
agents—over-population, hunger, eradication of natural
resources, ethnic hatred—the greater the temptation to
turn away, to seek distraction in the trivial, in cynicism,
and sometimes in exhausted despair.
The cosmic scope of apocalyptic vision vividly
reveals powerful threats to order. Even more importantly,
the imaginative power of the apocalyptic vision gives us
confidence that we are a part of a world and history in
which chaos is overcome with order, oppression with justice, evil with good. In the face of death and fate, those
with apocalyptic vision always have the confidence to
ask, “so what do we do?”
Those with apocalyptic vision experience moments
of song and worship as intimations of God’s glory. Those
caught up in the drama of the ages continue to act on
behalf of the endangered, weak, and vulnerable. Those
with apocalyptic vision oppose the tyrannies of disability
and disease, not to coerce the arrival of the city of God,
but to enact his ideal civilization. The apocalyptic vision
of a luminous city of health and harmony, “where death
and mourning and crying and pain will be no more” (Rev
21:4), makes opposition to the forces of death and dying
a sacrament, a participation in the overcoming of chaos in
God’s healing of the nations.
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proportionality isn’t a matter of weighing the benefit to be
achieved by the act against the harm to be avoided. That
kind of weighing is impossible. It’s not so much like comparing apples and oranges as it is like comparing apples and
operas. The two can’t be put on the same scale and
weighed against each other. Respecting the rule of proportionality is simply a matter of acting in a way that results in
no more harm than is necessary. It is a way of ensuring that
the harm one does is not gratuitous, and quite possibly,
intended.
4. The harm that results from my action must be a
direct result, in parallel with the good outcome I am trying
to achieve. The harm may not be a means to the good outcome. This is the point of discussing the rule of double
effect: a single action leads directly to two (or more) results,
one of which does not involve harm to oneself or someone
else. Only if the outcomes are distinguishable, and one
wills the harmless outcome, can one be said not to identify
with the harm to which one’s action leads.
These four requirements—consistency, unintendedness, proportionality, and directness—yield an acronym,
CUPiD, that encapsulates the principal requirements
embodied in the rule of double effect.
Is the rule of double effect of any practical value in contemporary clinical practice? Health care professionals may
be its most frequent users today, though it also underlies
many of the rules reflected in the so-called “just war” doctrine. But even health care professionals are often skeptical
about its worth.
I believe the rule is worth retaining. It embodies a
rejection of the tempting consequentialism that makes
each of us a little god responsible for the fate of the entire
universe, and a corresponding affirmation of the particular
that has long been a hallmark of excellent medical practice.
It makes clear what refusing to identify with evil looks like.
It offers a way to do good and to be good in the face of the
ambiguities each of us faces in a sinful and chaotic world.

Note
Double Effect

Continued from Page 2

must be sure that I am acting in conformity with the
Golden Rule and other applicable standards before I can
even inquire about the compatibility of my proposed
choice with the rule of double effect.
2. The harm that results from my action must be unintended. A simple test here would be to perform a thought
experiment: if, even by means of some occurrence conceivable only in science fiction or fantasy, the harm could
be avoided, would I be satisfied? This test is not foolproof,
of course. It is important to ask directly whether what one
really wants is the harm one is bringing about. If it is, one
has identified with the harm, and so willed evil.
3. The harm that results from my action must be proportional—that is, it must be no greater than the minimum
required to achieve the good outcome that is the real purpose of the action. For instance, to use an earlier example,
if I defend myself against an attacker by shooting her when
a simple shove would have protected me adequately, the
harm I’ve done is disproportionate. Respecting the rule of
Update Volume 16, Number 4

The understanding of the rule of double effect I elaborate here
derives from Germain Grisez, Toward a Consistent Natural-Law
Ethics of Killing, 15 AM. J. Juris. 64-96 (1970) and Joseph M. Boyle,
Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect, 90 Ethics 527
(1980). For alternate views, see, eg., Warren Quinn and Philippa
Foot, Morality and Action, (Cambridge University Press: 1993), pp.
175-97; Lucius Iwejurn Ugorji, The Principle of Double Effect: A
Critical Appraisal of Its Traditional Understanding and Its Modern
Reinterpretation (1985) Volume 245 (Peter Lang Publishing: 1985);
Jeffrey M. Ross, Proportionalism and the Principle of Double Effect
(MA thesis, Graduate Theological Union, 1994).
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